The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of Powers by Metzger, Gillian E.
Columbia Law School 
Scholarship Archive 
Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 
2009 
The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External 
Separation of Powers 
Gillian E. Metzger 
Columbia Law School, gmetzg1@law.columbia.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the President/Executive Department Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of Powers, 
EMORY LAW JOURNAL, VOL. 59, P. 423, 2009; COLUMBIA PUBLIC LAW RESEARCH PAPER NO. 09-213 (2009). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1599 
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For 
more information, please contact cls2184@columbia.edu. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1486288
Columbia Law School 
Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Group 
 
 





THE INTERDEPENDENT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SEPARATION OF POWERS 





PROFESSOR GILLIAN E. METZGER 
COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL 
 
 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1486288
October 7, 2009   Forthcoming, Emory Law Journal
 Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. *
 See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminancy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L.1
Rev. 678, 875, 886-88 (2003); Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of a
Thayerian Congress, 50 Duke L. J. 1277, 1279-86 (2001); Jerry L. Mashaw, Accountability and
Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on the Grammar of Governance, in Michael Dowdle ed.,
Public Accountability: Designs, Dilemmas and Experiences 115-156 (2006).
 David J. Barron, From Takeover to Merger: Reforming Administrative Law in an Age2
of Agency Politicization, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1095, 1096 (2008); Donald P. Moynihan &
Alasdair S. Roberts, The End of an Idea?  The Bush Administration and the Exhaustion of the
Politicized Presidency 4 (La Follette School, Working Paper No. 2008-024, 2008), available at
http://www.lafollette.wisc.edu/publications/workingpapers.
 See Memorandum Re: EPA's Denial of the California Waiver, House Committee on3
Oversight and Government Reform 1–2 (May 19, 2008), available at
http://oversight.house.gov/story.asp?ID=1956 (follow link to “Memo: EPA's Denial of the
California Waiver”) (noting that “[t]he record before the Committee suggests that the
White House played a pivotal role in the decision to reject the California petition,” and also that
“[i]nternal EPA documents and transcribed interviews with EPA staff show that the agency
career staff all supported granting the California petition”); Nina A. Mendelson, The California
Greenhouse Gas Waiver Decision and Agency Interpretation: A Response to Professors Galle
and Seidenfeld, 57 Duke L.J. 2157, 2169 (2008) (noting “apparent (though informal) White
1
ESSAY:
THE INTERDEPENDENT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL 
SEPARATION OF POWERS 
Gillian E. Metzger*
It has been the best of times and the worst of times for internal separation of powers.  
Over the past few years, internal checks on executive power have been central topic of legal
academic debate — rarely have details of public administrative structure received so much
attention.  To some extent, this sudden popularity reflects growing interest in questions of
institutional design.   Unfortunately, however, another reason for this attention is the prominent1
erosion and impotence of such internal constraints under the Bush administration.
  Though differing in subject area and form, the instances in which the Bush administration
appeared to evade and perhaps violate internal constraints on administrative decisionmaking can
largely be grouped under the heading of politicization of administration.   Some involved2
allegations that White House ideology and politics were determining agency decisions instead of
statutory criteria and professional assessment, like EPA’s denial of California’s application for a
waiver to set automobile emission limits for greenhouse gases or FDA’s refusal to allow the Plan
B emergency contraceptive to be sold over-the-counter.   Others involved charges of misuse of3
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House involvement” in reviewing California’s waiver application); Gillian E. Metzger, Abortion,
Equality, and Administrative Regulation, 56 Emory L.J. 865, 901–02 (2007) [hereinafter
Metzger, Administrative Regulation] (arguing that, “after-the-fact justifications reinforce the
suspicion that the FDA's decision [to deny over-the-counter status to Plan B emergency
contraceptives] was driven more by moral opposition to teenage sex and politics than the public
health concerns that constitute the agency's statutory mandate”).
 See, e.g., Office of the Inspector Gen. & Office of Prof'l Responsibility, U.S. Dep't of4
Justice, ?An Investigation of Allegations of Politicized Hiring and Other Improper Personnel
Actions in the Civil Rights Division 1 (2008), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/index.htm (follow “An Investigation of Allegations of
Politicized Hiring and Other Improper Personnel Actions in the Civil Rights Division, July 2,
2008 (Released Publicly January 13, 2009)); Office of the Inspector Gen. & Office of Prof’l
Responsibility, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, An Investigation into the Removal of Nine U.S. Attorneys
in 2006 (2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0809a/index.htm.
 See, e.g., Mark Bowen, Censoring Science 15–16, 34, 36, 49–50, 56, 124, 227 (2008)5
(describing how NASA scientists were required to pre-clear media appearances); Holly Doremus,
Scientific and Political Integrity in Environmental Policy, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 1601, 1603–17 (2008)
(describing complaints lodged against Bush Administration for editing scientific evaluations and
censoring agency scientists); Michele Estrin Gilman, The President as Scientist-in-Chief, 45
Willamette L. Rev. 565, 566 (2009) (noting allegations by government scientists of political
litmus tests, censorship, and political interference by the Bush administration); Michael Specter,
The Bush Administration’s War on the Laboratory, New Yorker, March 13, 2006 (reporting
administration officials “repeatedly altered government climate reports in order to minimize the
relationship between [greenhouse gas emissions] and global warming”); see also Exec. Order No.
13,422 §§ 4(b). 5(b), 72 Fed. Reg. 2763, 2764 (Jan.18, 2007) (adding requirement that approval
of agency regulatory policy officers ordinarily be required for rulemaking to commence and that
such officers be presidential appointee chosen in consultation with the Office of Management
and Budget).
 Jack Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment Inside the Bush6
Administration 166–68 (2007) (explaining White House “made it a practice to limit readership of
controversial legal opinions,” and that “under directions from the White House, O.L.C. did not
show [the 2002 torture memo] to the State Department, which would have strenuously objected,”
a practice Goldsmith “came to believe ... was done to control outcomes in opinions and minimize
2
personnel decisions for political purposes, such as claims that political affiliation and ideology
were a basis for civil service hiring at the Department of Justice (DOJ).   Still others involved4
efforts to restrict information dissemination and insert White House appointees into agency
rulemaking decisions allegedly to serve the administration’s political agenda.   Yet another5
category involved efforts to evade or silence dissenting internal voices, a phenomenon
particularly documented with respect to development of national security policy.  6
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resistance to them”) (referencing Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General,
Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President
(Aug. 1, 2002) ).
 Dan Eggen & Paul Kane, Gonzales Hospital Episode Detailed, Wash. Post, May 16,7
2007, at A1 (describing incident in which Attorney General John Ashcroft rebuffed White House
aides attempting to obtain his approval for re-authorization of National Security Agency
surveillance program); David Johnston & Scott Shane, Notes Detail Pressure on Ashcroft Over
Spying, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 2007, at A14 (same); see also Julian E. Barnes, Military Fought to
Abide by War Rules, L.A. Times, June 30, 2006, at A1 (describing conflict between
administration and military lawyers over military commissions).
 President Obama, has, for example, appointed numerous so-called “czars” to coordinate8
legislative and policy initiatives in the White House, see, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, A Role for
Congress to Reclaim, Wash. Post, March 11, 2009, at A15 (arguing White House Czars likely to
overshadow Cabinet officials); Christi Parsons & Tom Hamburger, White House Czars’ Power
Stirs Criticism, Chicago Tribune, March 5, 2009, at XXX (describing criticism of expanded use
of White House officials to coordinate policy matters). 
 A recent example of political attention to institutional design is the Obama9
administration’s proposal to pull responsibility for consumer protection from current federal
financial regulators and instead house this function, with expanded powers, in a new single-focus
agency, in order to ensure that consumer protection in financial contexts receives adequate
attention.  Binyamin Appelbaum and David Cho, Obama Blueprint Deepens Federal Role in
Markets, Wash. Post, June 17, 2009, at XXX (describing White House plan to create consumer
protection agency).
3
A possible lesson to draw from these incidents is that internal constraints are ultimately of
limited effect in checking aggrandized presidential authority.  To my mind, that conclusion is
unduly pessimistic.  Examples also exist of internal resistance playing an important role in
constraining the Bush administration’s efforts to push its policy beyond legal limits.   In addition,7
constraints that are ineffective in high profile policy disputes may have significant greater
potency in less public and politically charged contexts—and in high profile contexts, even
internal checks with limited effect may be preferable to no checks at all.  Moreover, presidential
insistence on a policy position over internal resistance may not actually be an example of internal
constraint failure.  Instead, sometimes such insistence may be constitutionally desirable instances
of direct presidential oversight of the executive branch decisionmaking that foster political
accountability.  At a minimum, no clear line separates forceful presidential assertion of
regulatory priorities and presidential aggrandizement, as recent discussion of the Obama
administration’s expansion of White House policy staff demonstrates.   8
I therefore see benefits from paying greater attention to internal administrative design,
and in particular to analyzing what types of administrative structures are likely to prove effective
and appropriate in different contexts.     But I believe that attending to internal constraints alone9
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 U.S. Const. art. I, § 1; id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2–3; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; id. art. II § 2, cl. 2; id.10
art. III, § 1. 
4
is too narrow a focus because it excludes the crucial relationship between internal and external
checks on the executive branch.  Internal checks can and often are reinforced by a variety of
external forces—including not just Congress and the courts, but also state and foreign
governments, international bodies, the media, and civil society organizations.   Moreover, the
reinforcement can also work in reverse, with internal constraints serving to enhance the ability of
external forces, in particular Congress and the courts, to exert meaningful checks on the
executive branch.  Greater acknowledgment of this reciprocal relationship holds import both for
fully understanding the separation of powers role played by internal constraints and for
identifying effective reform strategies. 
One internal-external connection meriting additional attention is the link between internal
executive branch constraints and external legal doctrine.  Contemporary separation of powers
doctrine makes little effort to reinforce internal executive branch constraints and instead largely
focuses on whether internal constraints intrude too far on presidential power, to the extent it
considers such constraints at all.  This stands in some contrast to administrative law doctrine,
which focuses primarily on internal executive branch behavior and often seeks to encourage
executive branch adherence to constraints on agency action.  This division of labor is not
coincidental; the availability of administrative law restrictions on agencies is one reason why the
courts have not sought to link internal and external constraints as a matter of separation of
powers analysis.  Judicial concerns about not unduly intruding into congressional and
presidential choices in structuring administration, and about the courts’ limited competency on
questions of institutional design, are likely in play as well.  Yet greater exploration of how
separation of powers doctrine could be used to reinforce internal executive branch constraints
appears justified, given the important separation of powers function that internal constraints can
serve.  
In what follows, I first describe internal separation of powers mechanisms and 
constitutional role they can play.  I next take up the question of whether these constraints are
effective checks on executive branch overreaching, and emphasize the mutually reinforcing
relationship between these internal constraints and external checks on the executive branch. 
Finally, I discuss the general failure of current separation of powers doctrine to directly connect
internal and external constraints and analyze whether including such a linkage would be
appropriate.
I.  INTERNAL SEPARATION OF POWERS MECHANISMS 
AND THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
The meaning of “internal separation of powers” is not immediately self-evident. The
Constitution says rather little on separation of powers, but the provisions it does include focus
overwhemingly on external relations between the branches—whether it be the branches’ division
and assignment of distinct powers (as in the Vesting Clauses) or their subsequent intermixing (as
in provisions for a presidential veto and senate advice and consent).   Although constitutional10
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 See, e.g., the opinions clause, id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1, the revenue bills originating clause,11
id. art. I, § 7, cl. 1, the provision for three classes of senators, id. art. I, § 3, cl. 2.
 For example, Article I gives discretion to the house and senate in determining their12
rules of procedure, id. art. I, § 5, cl. 2, and provides discretionary authority to congress in shaping
the government through the “necessary and proper” clause, id. art. I, § 7, cl. 18. 
 See I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).13
 For an account of the contrasting functionalist and formalist approaches to separation of14
powers, see generally Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-
Powers Questions—A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 488 (1987) [hereinafter
Strauss, Formal and Functional].
 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983); see also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,15
721–22 (1986) .
 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381 (1989); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 42416
U.S. 1, 121 (1976); Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
 See Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev.17
1513, 1517 (1991) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s treatment of the constitutional separation of powers
is an incoherent muddle.”);  Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law,
86 Va. L. Rev 1127, 1132, 1174–83 (2000) [hereinafter Magill, Real Separation] (explaining the
“set of principles constituting ‘separation of powers’ is far more easily invoked than specified”
5
requirements directed at operations within each branch do exist,  they are few and the11
constitutional pattern is either silence or express grants of discretion on internal branch
arrangements.   Indeed, to a constitutional formalist intent on sharp divisions among the12
branches and on policing against efforts by each branch to exceed its proper sphere,  the concept13
of internal separation of powers may seem a contradiction in terms.  As a result, some explication
and description of what are internal separation of powers measures and assessment of their
constitutional status is warranted.
A. Internal Separation of Powers Defined
The very idea of internal separation of powers is premised on a functionalist approach
that emphasizes general separation of powers principles rather than their specific manifestations
in the constitutional text.    These principles, well familiar from the Supreme Court’s separation14
of powers case law, include the division of the federal government’s powers “into three defined
categories, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial”  as well as the intermixing of the branches15
through “a carefully crafted system of checked and balanced power.”   Though often invoking16
these principles in a somewhat conclusory and inconsistent manner,  the Court has identified the17
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and noting inherent contradiction in current doctrine); see also Peter L. Strauss, The Place of and
the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573, 617 (1984) [hereinafter Strauss, Place of Agencies]
(describing contrast between separation of powers and checks and balances approaches). 
 Mistretta v. US, 488 U.S. 361, 382 (1989); Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (“the18
Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty”); cf. The Federalist No. 47, at 301
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (James Madison) (“[A]ccumulation of all powers,
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and
whether hereditary, self appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of
tyranny.”).
 Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996).  For descriptions of accountability19
as a core separation of powers value, see Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for
the Unitary Executive, 48 Ark. L. Rev. 23, 42–45 (1995) (describing accountability as one basis
for unitary executive theory); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the
Administration, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 93-94 (1994). 
 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 122; accord Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 382 (“It is this concern of20
encroachment and aggrandizement that has animated out separation-of-powers jurisprudence”).
 Congressional analogues are easiest to identify; they include not just the bicameral21
character of Congress, but also the division of each branch into separate and sometimes
competing committees, rules limiting the power of leadership to force votes and end debate,
independent research arms, the presence of majority and minority committee staff, and so on. 
Judicial checks also exist, however, such as division of the federal courts into geographic-based
circuits, the use of three-judge appellate panels, the possibility of en banc review, and also
jurisdictional limitations.  My focus here, following the literature, is on internal checks within the
executive branch.
6
ultimate goal of the separation of powers system as being to protect liberty and prohibit tyranny
by preventing “the accumulation of excessive authority in a single Branch.”    At the same time,18
in addition to deterring “arbitrary or tyrannical rule, . . . [b]y dispersing the federal power among
three branches . . . . [and] allocating powers and responsibilities to a branch fitted to the task, the
Framers created a National Government that is both effective and accountable.”    The Court’s19
efforts to secure these at times contradictory goals of diffused and checked power and
accountability has focused on preventing “the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at
the expense of another.”   20
The defining characteristic of internal separation of powers measures is that they seek to
achieve these goals by operating within the confines of a single branch, as opposed to through
interactions among the different branches of government or with other forces external to a
particular branch’s operations—mechanisms that I will here describe, to highlight the contrast, as
external separation of powers measures.   Although such internal measures are present in all the
branches,  the focus of internal separation of powers scholarship is overwhelmingly on the21
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 See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most22
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 Yale L.J. 2314, 2316 (2006) [hereinafter Katyal, Internal
Separation] (“The result [of the War on Terror] is an executive that subsumes much of the
tripartite structure of government.”); see also Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch,
105 Yale L.J. 1725, 1816–20 (1996) (describing accumulation of authority and responsibility in
th executive branch); Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential
Lawmaking, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 123, 125 (1994) (“In the post-New Deal world, however, the
framers’ factual assumptions have been displaced.  Now, it is the President whose power has
expanded and who therefore needs to be checked.”). 
 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556; see also Strauss, Place of Agencies, supra note 17, at 622–2523
(discussing individual fairness in considering separation of functions); Rachel E. Barkow,
Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 Stan.
L. Rev. 869, 890, 896 (2009) (noting due process benefits to separating enforcement and
adjudicative powers in law enforcement context).
 The extent of such independence is a matter of dispute.  See Neal Devins & David E.24
Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design,
88 B. U. L. Rev. 459, 477-79, 485-95  (2008) (finding party polarization increases presidential
control over supposedly independent agencies, but also delays the period before a new president
can appoint a majority of the agency’s commissioners).
 5 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2305 (2000) (merit system for personnel decisions); Katyal, Internal25
Separation, supra note 22, at 2331–335 (2006) (highlighting importance of independent civil
service and arguing for stronger protection from politicization).  Another example is the tenure
protections for administrative law judges (ALJs).  5 U.S.C. § 7513 (2004) (requiring “good cause
7
executive branch, reflecting the view that the greatest threat of aggrandized power today lies in
the broad delegations of power to the executive branch that characterize the modern
administrative and national security state.   Moreover, as that suggests, internal separation of22
powers is most often equated with measures that check or constrain the executive branch and
particularly presidential power.
A wide range of administrative structures and other mechanisms could be viewed as
serving such an internal executive branch checking function.  Some appear primarily animated by
individual fairness concerns and have a due process edge, in particular the division of functions
within agencies and the separation of adjudication from legislative, investigatory, and
enforcement activities.   Many others have a more systemic focus and seek to ensure regularity23
and the rule of law by depoliticizing governmental administration.  One example of the latter that
is prominent in separation of powers literature and case law is the independent agency, the heads
of which achieve some independence from the president as a result of term appointments and for-
cause removal protection.   Other internal personnel measures offer independence even within24
executive agencies, the prime instance here being the civil service and its prohibitions on
politically-motivated employment decisions.   Another important structural feature is the25
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established and determined by the Merit Systems Protection Board on the record after
opportunity for hearing” prior to removal, suspension, or reduction in pay of ALJs).
 Paul C. Light, Monitoring Government: Inspectors General and the Search for26
Accountability 23-25, 56 (1993) [hereinafter Light, Monitoring Government]. 
 This dynamic was evident in the FDA’s review of the application to make Plan B over-27
the-counter and is also frequently discussed in regard to the creation of separate national science
and health research institutes.  See Metzger, Administrative Regulation, supra note 3, at 880
(noting “FDA’s decision to reject the recommendations of both its advisory committees and the
directors and staff of the offices reviewing the application was a deviation from its usual practice
regarding OTC applications,” a signal of internal opposition); Thomas O. McGarrity & Sidney
Shapiro, Workers at Risk : The Failed Promise of the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration 194 (1993) (explaining “the Senate may have desired to protect NIOSH’s
‘scientific integrity’ by sheltering it from the day-to-day political and interest group pressures to
which OSHA is constantly subjected, thereby allowing NIOSH to serve as a check on any
propensity in OSHA to reach conclusions inconsistent with scientific knowledge,” but also
noting attendant coordination problems).
 Some scholars have recently defended redundancy in national intelligence28
responsibilities on this ground. See Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart
Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing Agencies in the Post 9-11 World, 94 Cal. L. Rev. 1655,
1689 (2006) (“[T]he most effective [national intelligence] structure probably would have
redundant components as well as components that coordinate and centralize certain efforts.”); see
also Katyal, Internal Separation, supra note 22, at 2324–28 (advocating bureaucratic overlap in
national security).
 Goldsmith, supra note 6, at XXX (“OLC is, and views itself as, the front line institution29
responsible for ensuring that the executive branch charged with executing the law is itself bound
by law.”); Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal Constraints on
8
presence of separate agency watchdogs, such as inspector generals, protected by structural
insulation within agencies and independent reporting relationships with Congress.    Division of26
employees into distinct organizational units or agencies can also serve to limit the role of raw
political calculations in policysetting, in part by breeding agency cultures that foster more
professionalized and expertise-based decisionmaking.   Indeed, simply the structural mechanism27
of dividing staff with similar responsibilities into separate agencies can serve a checking
function, as their separate administrative homes may foster different perspectives and lead to
different sources of information.   Internal constraints can also take a “soft” form, being rooted28
more in agency traditions and culture than “hard” structural features.  A case in point here is the
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in the Department of Justice, which has at times operated as a
check on the President as well as other agencies, despite being headed by political appointees and
lacking structural insulation.29
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Executive Power, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 1559, 1577–78 (2007) [hereinafter Johnsen, Internal
Constraints] (explaining that “OLC's legal interpretations typically are considered binding within
the executive branch, unless overruled by the attorney general or the President (an exceedingly
rare occurrence),” and noting OLC’s “tradition of accurate and principled legal advice”);
Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands,  103
Mich. L. Rev. 676, 703, 710–17 (2005) [hereinafter Pillard, Constitution] (discussing relative
OLC independence and noting OLC “characterized by relative disengagement from [its] client
entities, staffed largely with career lawyers whose principal credentials are their legal skills, and
ha[s] tended to foster within [its] own legal culture[] a distinction between politics and law”).
 Jack M. Beerman, Combating Midnight Regulation, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 352,30
360 (2009) (noting actions to reverse last minute regulation by the Bush administration).  Such
efforts also occurred eight years earlier, when the Bush administration confronted a number of
rules adopted by the Clinton administration just before leaving office.  See Natural Res. Def.
Council v. Abraham, 355 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2004) (describing Bush administration attempt to
reverse Clinton era rule published Jan. 22, 2001).
 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist31
Foundations, 1787-1801, 115 Yale. L. J. 1256, 1261-62 (2006) (discussing “internal law of
administration” consisting of internal instructions issued by higher level officials to control
subordinate officias’s exercises of discretion).
 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b–c) (describing notice and comment requirements).  But see 532
U.S.C. § 553 (a) (exempting rules relating to agency management, including personnel matters,
from notice an comment requirements); 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (similarly exempting “rules of agency
organization, procedure, or practice”).
 See Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules In the Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring Proper33
Respect for an Essential Element, 53 Ad. L. Rev. 803, 804-07 (2001) (describing publication and
procedural constraints that can apply to agency guidance).
9
Separate from agency structure, personnel measures, and culture are those internal
constraints that target how agencies operate and their procedures.  Most prominent among these
might be thought the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which imposes procedural
requirements that agencies must follow in formal adjudication and in adopting or changing
binding regulations—the latter feature receiving attention recently as the Obama administration
sought to undo last-minute Bush administration rulemaking.    More important on a day-to-day30
basis are the agency guidance, policy manuals and agency regulations that govern much of the
operation of federal programs.   But although it regulates how agencies act, the APA is as much31
an external check as an internal one; not only does its procedural demands focus primarily on
ensuring an opportunity for the public to participate in agency decisionmaking, the APA exempts
many internal matters from its orbit.   Publication and procedural requirements that attach to32
agency guidance lend it external dimensions as well,  and other procedural checks, such as the33
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 These panels often form a core part of an agency’s regulatory approach, but are34
composed primarily of outside experts.  A good example is the use of scientific advisory panels
in drug regulation.  See Lars Noah, Scientific “Republicanism”: Expert Peer Review and the
Quest for Regulatory Deliberation, 49 Emory L.J. 1033, 1054–57 (2000) (describing FDA use of
technical advisory panels); see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(n) (setting out composition requirements for
FDA advisory committees used in drug regulation and describing their functions); see generally 1
Food and Drug Admin. § 13:94 (2009) (describing role of advisory committees in new drug
applications).  In 2007, Congress added new controls to help prevent conflicts of interest on FDA
advisory panels.  See Pub. L. No. 110-85 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 379d-1).
 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58, Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993), amended by Exec. Order35
No. 13,422, 72, Fed. Reg. 2763 (Jan. 18, 2007).
 See  Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”?  The President in Administrative36
Law, 75 Geo. Wash. L. rev. 696, 702 (2006) [hereinafter Strauss, Overseer] (“[Executive Orders
12,866 and 13,422] threaten the control of agency heads over their agencies’ agendas and effect a
dramatic increase in presidential control over regulatory outcomes”).  Although OMB enhances
presidential control, it might also undermine an administration’s pro-regulatory agenda due to
cost cutting biases.  See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the
Regulatory State, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1260, 1267 (2006) (suggesting that regardless of
administration political agenda, Executive Order 12,866, “contains within it several structural
and institutional biases against regulation”).  Moreover, as David Barron has argued, identifiable
White House involvement in and centralization of policy setting may be less threatening to
agency independence than some alternatives, such as increased politicization of agency
appointments. See Barron, supra note 2, at 1120–21; see generally Terry M. Moe, The Politicized
Presidency, in The New Direction in American Politics 235, 244–45 (John E. Chubb & Paul E.
Peterson eds., 1985) (noting presidential incentives to centralize and politicize administration).
 Barron, supra note 2, at 1128, 1142 (noting “surge in the number of politically37
appointed positions created during the first term of President George W. Bush” and describing
effect of politicization on the EPA during Bush administration); Strauss, Overseer, supra note 36,
42, at 701–02 (describing expanded role of Regulatory Policy Officers and requirement of
10
requirement of advisory committee participation or review, similarly share a joint internal and
external character.   34
By contrast, one central constraint on rulemaking, the requirement of OMB regulatory
review,  is acknowledgedly internal but is less often thought of as a separation of powers35
mechanism because it fosters rather than checks presidential control over agencies.   Without36
doubt, presidential interventions and assertions of decisionmaking power can undermine
expertise and independence in administration, particularly if pushed too far into agency structures
and personnel.  Thus, for example, one of the more worrying trends during the Bush
administration was the expansion of political appointees and their insertion deeper into agency
structures than had been prior practice.   Nor is it clear that broad presidential political control is37
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political appointment); David E. Lewis, The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political
Control and Bureaucratic Performance 19–21, 137 (2008) (showing number of political
appointees increased during George W. Bush administration, and noting that today, half of all
civilian workforce positions exempt from merit system compared to only 10 percent in 1951);
see also Paul C. Light, Thickening Government: Federal Hierarchy and the Diffusion of
Accountability 7 (1995) (finding 430 percent increase in senior executives and presidential
appointees from 1960 to 1992).
 See Heidi Kitrosser, The Accountable Executive, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 1741, 1743, 177438
(2009) [hereinafter Kitrosser, Accountable] (arguing that a unitary executive approach
undermines accountability by increasing the president’s ability to control information and “make
or implement policy behind closed doors”); see also Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the
Governed: Against Simple Rules for a Complex World, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 987, 992-1007
(1997) (arguing that accountability justifications for strong presidentialism are premised on false
understandings of popular will); Flaherty, supra note 22, at __ (similarly arguing that political
accountability justifications for broad presidential authority rest on an unduly simple
understanding of accountability); Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the
Bureaucracy, 107 Mich L Rev 53, 55 (2008) (arguing that “a moderate degree of bureaucratic
insulation alleviates rather than exacerbates the countermajoritarian problems inherent in
bureaucratic policymaking”). 
 See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2263-64, 2331-39
46 (2001) (emphasizing need for “ direction and energy” as well as administrative constraints and
arguing that presidential involvement leads to more accountable, responsive, and effective
government); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 19, at 98 (arguing that in the context of the modern
administrative state, immunizing administrators from presidential control harms  undermines
separation of powers values by limiting accountability and increasing the risk of faction) . 
 See Strauss, Formal and Functional, supra note 14, at 495 (“Any workable theory must40
not only avoid placing excessive power in the President's hands, but also maintain his claim to a
central and unifying governmental role-that is, to a relationship with all agencies that permits the
exercise of his characteristic functions.”). 
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the best method for ensuring politically responsive decisionmaking.  Not only can such a
presidential role undermine popular input on government policy through Congress, it can also
restrict the political accountability of the executive branch, by limiting transparency and
minimizing the effect of participatory and open administrative processes.   38
Yet at the same time, unilateral agency decisionmaking is also problematic from a
separation of powers perspective, raising dangers of an unaccountable fourth branch and
ineffective government.   Such unilateral decisionmaking is additionally at odds with39
constitutional provisions mandating some form of presidential oversight of executive branch
officials and the constitutional decision to adopt a single rather than plural executive.   Put40
differently, the line between excessive politicization and appropriate presidential political input is
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 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952)41
(Jackson, J., concurring) (“When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed
or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own
constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.”). 
 See Kagan, supra note 39, at 2251, 2372–80; Strauss, Overseer, supra note 36, 42, at42
715–18 (finding a presidential role uncontroversial where “presidential authority readily fit the
“oversight” mold and/or may have been explicitly conferred by Congress”).
 For a recent analysis of the phenomenon of executive branch voluntary impositions, see43
Elizabeth Magill, Foreword:  Agency Self-Regulation, 77 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 859 (2009)
[hereinafter Magill, Agency Self-Regulation].
 See David E. Lewis, The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and44
Bureaucratic Performance 1, 55 (2008) (noting abysmal federal response to Hurricane Katrina
and role of political appointees and arguing that “[s]ince voters and history judge presidents for
he performance of the entire federal government during their tenure, this creates incentives for
presidents to ensure that policy outcomes, both legislative and administrative, are under their
control”); see also Moe, supra note 36, at 238 (explaining president motivated by “political
support and opposition, political strategy, and political tradeoffs,” and therefore values
“‘responsive competence,’ not neutral competence”); Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why
Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. Econ. & Org. 81, 95 (1985) (asserting
that Presidents, unlike legislators, are judged based on the effect of general government policies).
 Moe, supra note 36, at 239, 244–45; see also Barron, supra note 2, at 1102 (identifying45
concepts of centralization and politicization);  Kagan, supra note 39, at 2339 (describing
presidential incentives).
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often unclear.  Presidential violation of governing statutes is plainly prohibited except in the rare
instances when Congress intrudes on the president’s constitutional powers,  but statutes often41
leave broad room for presidential discretion.  In those contexts at least, presidential oversight as
assertions of authority may best reflect constitutional structure and separation of powers values.  42
As a result, categorically excluding mechanisms that enhance rather than check presidential
oversight reflects an unjustifiably narrow conception of internal separation of powers.
It is also important not to lose sight of a centrally important fact:  Presidents frequently
support imposition of internal mechanisms that substantially constrain the executive branch, even
sometimes adopting such measures voluntarily on their own or at agency initiative.   Part of the43
explanation for this is politics, but part is also that presidents are judged on their ability to govern
effectively.   Terry Moe has argued that such presidential performance accountability leads to44
core dynamics of executive branch centralization and politicization, as a president wants “an
institutional system responsive to his needs as a political leader.  He values organizational
competence, to be sure, but what he seeks is “responsive competence,” not neutral
competence.”   Yet presidents’ political accountability may also lead them to support45
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 Barron, supra note 2, at 1111–12.46
 Lewis, supra note 37, at 195–97 (using Bush administration’s Program Assessment47
Rating Tool (PART) scores to find lower performance ratings of political appointees, and
suggesting that “reducing the number of political appointees is one means of improving
performance”). 
 See Magill, Agency Self-Regulation, supra note ?, at 884-86; see also Jerry L. Mashaw,48
Reluctant Nationalists: Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Republican Era,
1801–1829, 116 Yale L.J. 1636, 1685–86 (2007) (“Administrators ... fear the centrifugal effects
of discretion vested in subordinates. If for no reason other than self-protection, .... they inevitably
construct supervisory routines and modes of instruction to bend peripheral discretion toward
centralized control.”); Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring
Proper Respect for an Essential Element, 53, Admin. L. Rev. 803, 814 (2001) (“From an agency
perspective, uniformity of administration nationwide is desirable and the agency may doubt
whether its pool of not-so-well-paid inspectors will be able to handle so much discretion.”).
 Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the49
Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541, 594–96 (1994) (arguing power of “removal, a power to act in [inferior
officer’s] stead, and a power to nullify [inferior officer’s] acts when the President disapproves”
are constitutionally required).  For commentary critical of unitary executive claims, see Farina,
13
administrative structures that are more independent.  As David Barron has recently noted,
sometimes “[a] system for making regulatory policy that is administrative in orientation may
itself serve a given President’s agenda,” a situation Barron contends existed under President
Franklin Roosevelt, who sought to “bulk[] up the regulatory state.”   Presidents may also find46
that responsiveness and competence conflict; in a recent study David Lewis concluded that
programs run by expert professional administrators perform better on the whole than those run by
political appointees.   Presidents may well be willing to forego politicization or centralization at47
times and opt for a form of administration they can less easily control, if they believe that doing
so will yield more effective performance.   Finally, presidents may also conclude that internal
constraints are in fact essential to ensure their ability to control administration, by providing a
mechanism that can limit on the ground discretion of agency officials.48
B.  The Constitutional Legitimacy of Internal Separation of Powers
The profusion of possible internal separation of powers mechanisms complicates
assessments of their constitutional legitimacy.   To be sure, many internal checks on presidential
power are likely to be decried by unitary executive theorists who argue that under our
constitutional scheme the President is granted control over all exercises of executive power.  On
the unitary executive view, the President must be able to remove any officer or employee and to
set all administrative policy, even at the extreme of substituting his judgment for that of the
agency head in whom a statute vested decisionmaking authority.   For unitary executives, then,49
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supra note 11, 13, at 987–89 (rejecting democratic legitimation argument of unitarians); Lessig &
Sunstein, supra note 19, at 2–3 (“[T]he view that the framers constitutionalized anything like [the
unitary] vision of the executive is just plain myth.”); Strauss, Overseer, supra note 36, 42,
702–03 (finding Constitution “at best ambivalent on the question” of whether President may
direct agency determination of policy matters).
 Calabresi & Yoo, supra note ?, at 420–22 (direction of subordinates); id. at 422–2350
(civil service); id. at. 423–25 (independent agencies).
 See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685–96 (1988).  The Court will hear a case51
in the coming term raising the question of the extent to which executive branch officials must be
subject to presidential removal.  See Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight
Board, 537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 77 U.S.L.W. 3431 (U.S. May 18, 2009) (No.
08-861). 
 See, e.g., Saikrishna B. Prakash, Fragmented Features of the Constitution’s Unitary52
Executive, 45 Willamette L. Rev. 701, 705 (2009) (“The power to create offices is not merely the
limited power to create generic offices, leaving the President to determine each office's functions
and duties.  Rather, when Congress creates a Secretary of Treasury or a Secretary of the Interior,
it may establish the powers and duties of these offices.”); see also United States v. Kendall, 37
U.S. 12, (Pep) 524 (1838).
 Strauss, Overseer, supra note 36, 42, at 715–18; see also Harold H. Bruff, Balance of53
Forces: Separation of Powers Law in the Administrative State 455–74 (2006).
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internal constraints such as independent agencies, the civil service, and assertions of independent
agency policysetting authority actually violate constitutional separation of powers principles.  50
That view is of course subject to much debate, and has failed to find much support at the
Supreme Court.   51
The more interesting point to note here is that even unitary executivists might not
question the constitutionality of some of the measures described above.  Voluntarily adopted
measures are an obvious example; although the policy benefits and costs of such constraints
could be disputed, it is hard to view self-imposed executive branch constraints as a significant
threat to presidential constitutional authority.  In addition, few deny that Congress has the power
to require that standards be based on scientific criteria and evidence, to divide functions within
agencies or assign similar responsibilities to multiple agencies, even if the effect of such
measures is to bolster internal checks on presidential decisionmaking and control.   In like vein,52
those scholars who have raised concerns about expanding presidential authority generally accept
the constitutionality of presidential efforts to oversee agency decisionmaking, provided such
efforts do not extend so far as to involve presidential assumption of decisionmaking power that
Congress has vested in agency heads.53
October 7, 2009   Forthcoming, Emory Law Journal
 Even in the context of the military, the Court has insisted on executive branch54
adherence to congressional strictures, see, e.g., Hamdan v Rumsfeld, 548 US 557, 590–95 (2006)
(finding Presidential national security powers not sufficient to expand on statutorily specified
procedures for military trials).
 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685–96 (1988); Wiener v. United States, 35755
U.S. 349, 356 (1958); Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629-31 (1935).
 The Free Enterprise decision on the Court’s docket for next term may not reach this56
question, as the statute at issue there made no provision for presidential removal and instead
vested for cause removal authority in the SEC, an independent commission whose members also
enjoy removal protections.  Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board, 537
F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 77 U.S.L.W. 3431 (U.S. May 18, 2009) (No. 08-861).
 United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483 (1886); see also Myers v. United States, 27257
U.S. 52, 173 (1926) (rebuffing critique that removal power would contravene civil service
protections).
 Massachusetts  v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).58
 Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006).59
 See e.g. Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to60
Expertise, 2007 Sup. Ct. Rev. 51, 52 (identifying these decisions as instances in which a majority
was “worrie[d] about the politicization of administrative expertise”); Kathryn A. Watts,
Proposing A Place for Politics in Arbitrary-and-Capricious Review, 119 Yale Law Journal
(forthcoming XXX) (manuscript at 18, 21–22) (discussing administrative law’s resistance to
political justifications for agency action).
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In any event, whatever the scholars’ views, under current doctrine the vast majority of
internal separation of powers mechanisms within the executive branch are constitutional.   Most54
prominently, the Court has repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of restrictions on the
president’s power to remove high-level executive branch officers.   Even if the Court were to55
revisit that determination,  it is quite unlikely to call into question many other structural56
protections for intra-executive branch independence.  In particular, the Court long ago upheld the
constitutionality of the civil service, and reiterated that view in its decision most favorable to
presidential control.   The Court has also repeatedly enforced substantive statutory requirements57
over contrary presidential priorities, with Massachusetts v. EPA  and Gonzales v. Oregon58 59
being just two recent examples.   Hence, as a practical matter the constitutionality of statutory60
provisions mandating science or expert-based decisionmaking or for segregating professional and
expert employees organizationally seems at this point beyond debate.
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 The Federalist No. 48, at 305 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).61
 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 Notre Dame. L. Rev.62
1441, 1444–46 (2008) (describing barriers to legislative action).
 Cf. Johnsen, Internal Constraints, supra note 29, at 1562 (arguing Congress is an63
inadequate check on presidential power in part because of need to overcome veto).
 See, e.g., William G. Howell & Jon C. Pevehouse, While Dangers Gather:64
Congressional Checks on Presidential War Powers 10–27 (2007) (describing congressional
powers in face of executive intransigence); Douglas Kriner, Can Enhanced Oversight Repair “the
Broken Branch”?, 89 B.U. L. Rev. 765, 773–75 (2009) (describing importance of congressional
oversight).
 Kagan, supra note 39, at 2311–12 (noting “congressional parties have grown more65
ideologically coherent and partisan,” but also arguing that divided power is the reality of modern
government); Katyal, Internal Separation, supra note 22, at 2321 (“When the political branches
are controlled by the same party, loyalty, discipline, and self-interest generally preclude
interbranch checking.”); see generally Thomas Mann & Norman Ornstein, The Broken Branch:
How Congress is Failing America and How to Get Back on Track (2006).
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II.  THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SEPARATION OF POWERS
A separate question to raise about internal separation of powers mechanisms concerns
their effectiveness, particularly as measures aimed at constraining executive branch
aggrandizement.  Are they actually able to constrain excessive presidential assertions of authority
and other abuses?  Or are they, in the end, little more than “parchment barriers”  that are largely61
ineffective or worse may obscure the extent of accumulated presidential power?
The case in favor of internal mechanisms is in part comparative.  Real limitations exist on
the ability of traditional external constraints, specifically Congress and the courts, to check the
executive branch.  The fundamental impediments for Congress are internal ones, in particular its
need to proceed via the arduous process of bicameralism and presentment and the additional
obstacles created by congressional committees and rules.   The ordinary burdens of the62
legislative process are intensified in contexts involving efforts to check presidential authority,
given the frequent need to overcome a presidential veto.   Congress does wield important63
investigatory and oversight powers, and has other tools that may give it leverage over the
president, such as control over spending or the ability to add contentious measures to must-pass
legislation.   But the political reality of party allegiance dominating over institutional interests,64
along with greater ideological cohesion in congressional parties, undermines these techniques 
and makes rigorous congressional constraints on presidential actions unlikely except in contexts
of divided government.   Moreover, even if Congress is willing to undertake oversight, its ability65
to do so may be significantly hampered by executive branch non-cooperation or intransigence,
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 The Bush administration repeatedly demonstrated such resistance to congressional66
oversight, ranging from its early 2001 refusal to turn over documents relating Vice-President
Cheney’s energy task force, see to its 2007 invocation of executive privilege to shield high-level
presidential aides from testifying about the removal of seven U.S. attorneys to its 2008 attempt to
block access to an EPA draft document finding that greenhouse gases endanger the environment.  
See Heidi Kitrosser, Accountability and Administrative Structure, 45 Willamette L. Rev. 607,
609 (2009) [hereinafter Kitrosser, Administrative Structure]; Mark J. Rozell & Mitchel A.
Sollenberger, Executive Privilege and the Bush Administration, 24 J. L. & Politics 1, 12–18, 37-
38 (2008).  The Bush administration has also been accused of tampering with data that was
publicly released.  See, e.g., Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 60, at 55 (“[T]here were
suggestions of widespread tampering by the Bush administration with the global warming data
reported by numerous federal agencies, including EPA.”).  Whether Congress was adequately
informed of the Bush Administration’s program for expanded domestic national security
wiretapping is a question currently in dispute.  See, e.g., Perry Bacon Jr. and Joby Warrick, CIA
Chief Rebuts Pelosi’s Charges, The Washington Post, May 16, 2009, at XXX.
 Johnsen, supra note 29, at 1587 (“Courts employ a variety of jurisdictional and67
prudential limitations that either preclude review--such as standing and the political question
doctrine--or that result in only partial review.”); Pillard, Constitution, supra note 29, at 688–91
(describing “acute practical and legal limitations on the courts’ ability and willingness to decide
many constitutional issues that confront the executive branch”).
 See A.C.L.U. v. N.S.A., 493 F.3d 644, 656 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct.68
1334 (2008) (“Because there is no evidence that any plaintiff's communications have ever been
intercepted, and the state secrets privilege prevents discovery of such evidence ... the anticipated
harm is neither imminent nor concrete-it is hypothetical, conjectural, or speculative.  Therefore,
this harm cannot satisfy the “injury in fact” requirement of standing.”).
 Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1095, 114069
(2009) (“[W]here judges perceive an emergency ... standards of rationality, statutory clarity,
evidence, and reasonableness all become more capacious and forgiving.”); see also Pillard,
Constitution, supra note 29, at 692 (“In cases involving foreign policy, national security, military,
or immigration judgments, the courts systematically apply doctrines of overt deference that cause
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often in the form of assertions of executive privilege and failure to inform Congress of
contentious activities.  66
Courts, in turn, face jurisdictional barriers that limit their ability to review executive
branch actions.   Such barriers have recently surfaced in litigation challenging the government’s67
expansion of domestic wiretapping without complying with FISA requirements, with the Sixth
Circuit holding that plaintiffs’ claims of injury from the program were too speculative to provide
a basis for standing to challenge the program.   Even when actions are justiciable, the courts’68
effectiveness as a check can be significantly curtailed by their deference to reasonable executive
branch policy determinations, particularly in the area of national security.   Courts are also69
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them to refrain from full enforcement of constitutional norms, leaving that task to the political
branches.”).
 See Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 129 S.Ct. 1142, 1151 (2009) (“[D]eprivation of70
a procedural right without some concrete interest that is affected by the deprivation—a
procedural right in vacuo—is insufficient to create Article III standing.”); Heckler v. Chaney, 470
U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (“[Supreme Court] has recognized on several occasions over many years
that an agency's decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is
a decision generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion.”).
 See Pillard, Constitution, supra note 29, at 689 (finding that “even where private parties71
can get courts to respond to their constitutional harms, they may face interstitial deprivations”
including delay and irreparable injury).
 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).72
 See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 US73
557 (2006).
 Kitrosser, Administrative Structure, supra note 17, at 609 (describing Bush74
administration attempts to stall EPA rulemaking on climate change following Supreme Court
ruling).
 See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2275 (2008) (noting, in 2008, that “[i]n75
some of these cases six years have elapsed without the judicial oversight that habeas corpus or an
adequate substitute demands.”).
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reluctant to intervene to correct general failures in administration or prompt executive branch
action.   An additional major impediment is delay; courts must wait for cases to come to them,70
and challenges to presidential action or policy are likely to be appealed.    This is not to say that71
deference and inaction necessarily undermine judicial checks; the Supreme Court’s rejection of
the Bush Administration’s refusal to regulate greenhouse gases in Massachusetts v. EPA  and72
recent decisions rebuffing broad presidential assertions of power regarding the Guantanamo Bay
detainees  are important testaments to the contrary.  Yet even in these contexts the limits of73
judicial constraints are evident.  Although the EPA proposed regulating greenhouse gases under
the Clean Air Act in response to the decision in Massachusetts, the White House refused to act
on the proposal and no formal action towards regulating greenhouse gases had yet been taken
when President Obama assumed office over a year and a half later.   The seven-year-and-74
ongoing saga of habeas challenges involving the Guantanamo Bay detention center demonstrates
even more vividly that it can be years before judicial review forces a change in executive branch
behavior on the ground.75
Several bases exist for thinking that internal separation of powers mechanisms may have
a comparative advantage.  Internal mechanisms operate ex ante, at the time when the executive
branch is formulating and implementing policy, rather than ex post; they are therefore able to
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 Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy:76
Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 Va L. Rev. 431, 433
(1989) (“[E]ffective political control of an agency requires ex ante constraints on the agency (that
is, a means of restricting the agency's decisionmaking before it actually makes policy choices),
one source of which is manipulation of its structure and process.”); see also Kenneth A.
Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy Decisionmaking in Administrative Agencies, 75 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 75, 106 (2008) (noting ex ante controls may overcome shortcomings of ex post
monitoring); see also Laura A. Dickinson, Outsourcing War and Peace (forthcoming 2010)
(emphasizing internalization of rules and norms as a more effective check than external controls,
and describing efforts by military to encourage such internalization, such as integrating JAG
officers into command structures).
 Pillard, supra note 29, at 690–91 (describing deficiencies of ex post judicial review in77
ensuring constitutionality of executive actions); Matthew D. McCubbins, Abdication or
Delegation? Congress, the Bureaucracy, and the Delegation Dilemma, Regulation, Summer
1999, at 33, explaining "[Congressional] leaders do not have to spend a lot of time looking for
trouble. Waiting for trouble to be brought to their attention assures leaders that the trouble is
important to constituents.").
 See Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law,78
110 Colum. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2010, manuscript on file) at 32 n.66 (discussing “greater
effectiveness of internally generated reforms”); Stephanie Stern, Cognitive Consistency: Theory
Maintenance and Administrative Rulemaking, 63 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 589, 591 (2002) (suggesting a
“bias towards the maintenance of existing beliefs,” and thus that agencies more receptive to new
ideas before “lock-in” of policy preferences); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment
Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 458, 522 (2001) (“Judicially
developed and imposed systems frequently trigger strong resentment and resistance, and they
invite strategic behavior aimed at minimizing the impact of the law.”).
 See supra test accompanying notes 22–23 (explaining how internal checks foster79
expertise and information generation); see also Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social
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avoid the delay in application that can hamper both judicial and congressional oversight.  76
Internal mechanisms often operate continuously, rather than being limited to issues that generate
congressional attention or arise in the form of a justiciable challenge.   Internal mechanisms77
operate not just at the points at which policy proposals originate and are implemented but also at
higher managerial levels, and thus can address policy and administration in both a granular and a
systemic fashion.  In addition, policy recommendations generated through internal checks may
face less resistance than those offered externally, because the latter frequently arise after
executive officials have already decided upon a policy course and are more likely to take an
adversarial form.   Internal mechanisms may also gain credibility with executive branch officials78
to the extent they are perceived as contributing to more fully informed and expertise-based
decisionmaking.79
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Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 486, 515–16 (2002)
[hereinafter Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing] (noting agencies more likely to respond to review
where perceived legitimacy of reviewing audience).
 See M. Elizabeth Magill, Can Process Cure Substance? A Response to Neal Katyal's80
“Internal Separation of Powers”, 116 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 126, 130 (2006) [hereinafter, Magill,
Response] (emphasizing that President Bush pursued post-September 11 policies despite internal
dissent); see also William G. Howell, Political Checks on a Politicized Presidency: a Response to
Neal Katyal's “Internal Separation of Powers”, 116 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 111 (2006) (noting
“essentially political nature of bureaucratic structure” and methods the executive might employ
to circumvent internal opposition). 
 See Doremus, supra note 5, at 1603–9(describing allegations that Bush administration81
political appointees interfered in work of agency scientists); Gilman, supra note 5, at 566 (noting
complaints of scientists “who claimed they were censored, forced to alter their conclusions, and
prohibited from issuing reports and attending conferences”); Mendelson, supra note 3, at 2164
(“[T]hough Office of Management and Budget clearance was not required for this decision, EPA
officials reportedly consulted with the White House on the decision [to deny California’s waiver
for stricter greenhouse gas regulations] anyway.”); Metzger, Administrative Regulation, supra
note 3, at 881 (describing rejection of “recommendations of both [FDA] advisory committees
and the directors and staff of the offices reviewing the application [for over-the-counter status for
Plan B]”).
 See Goldsmith, supra note 6, at 166–68 (2007) (describing Bush administration practice82
of “limit[ing] readership of controversial legal opinions [from OLC] to a very small group of
lawyers,” and specifically exclusion of state department from consideration of torture memos);
Cornelia Pillard, Unitariness and Myopia: the Executive Branch, Legal Process, and Torture, 81
Ind. L.J. 1297, 1303–05 (2006) [hereinafter Pillard, Unitariness] (highlighting importance of
consultation within executive branch and suggesting that key entities were not consulted during
drafting of torture memos); see also Jane Mayer, Annals of the Pentagon: the Memo, The New
Yorker, February 27, 2006.
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At the same time, it is important not to exaggerate the ability of internal separation of
powers mechanisms to check presidential authority.  Although as noted presidents have reasons
to adhere to these mechanisms, they also have strong incentives to trump and evade internal
checks in order to advance their political agendas and desired policy goals.  Particularly in the
face of a determined president, the constraining power of internal checks can be quite limited. 
Perhaps more than any other, this is the lesson brought home by the Bush administration.  80
Policy decisions were repeatedly made against the recommendations of career professional staff,
often with evidence of direct White House intervention.   In other instances, most prominently81
the promulgation of OLC memos on torture and interrogation techniques, top presidential
officials avoided consulting with career staff or involving other agencies with expertise on the
questions.   Both entrenched practices and legal constraints guaranteeing political independence82
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 See Office of the Inspector Gen. & Office of Prof'l Responsibility, Politicized Hiring,83
supra note?, at 64 (finding Justice Department official “considered political and ideological
affiliations in hiring career attorneys and in other personnel actions affecting career attorneys in
the Civil Rights Division. In doing so, he violated federal law” and that “[i]n doing so, he
violated federal law ... and [Justice] Department policy”);  Office of the Inspector Gen. & Office
of Prof'l Responsibility, U.S. Attorneys, supra note 4, at 356 (“Process used to remove the nine
U.S. Attorneys in 2006 was fundamentally flawed.”); Johnsen, supra note 29, at 1578 (“Many
[former OLC attorneys] were deeply outraged and saddened by what they saw as a dramatic and
dangerous deviation from the office's tradition of accurate and principled legal advice on
violation of OLC practices.”); see also U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, No. GAO-06-109, Food
and Drug Administration: Decision Process to Deny Initial Application for Over-the-Counter
Marketing of the Emergency Contraceptive Drug Plan B Was Unusual 5 (2005),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06109.pdf (noting Plan B denial letter’s deviation from
consistent FDA practice).
 See Magill, Response, supra note 80, at 126, 130 (arguing that belief that further84
internal process would impede President was “misplaced” and that Bush administration faced
internal dissent but “adopted the course that they did despite those objections”).
 Johnsen, supra note 29, at 1562 (emphasizing role of internal legal constraints in face85
of “inherent inadequacies of the courts and Congress as external checks on the President”).
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were violated.   As Elizabeth Magill has argued, even the strongest internal constraints are83
unlikely to be that effective in contexts in which the president is committed to a policy
fundamentally at odds with the suggestions generated by agency independents.  84
Yet it does not follow that efforts to strengthen internal checking mechanisms are
necessarily misdirected.  The potential separation of powers benefits of such mechanisms,
particularly given the limitations of external checks, makes these efforts worthwhile.  85
Moreover, high profile political disputes are too narrow a frame against which to assess the
effectiveness of internal constraints.  Even if unable to check a determined president in contexts
of deep political disagreement, internal constraints may still prove potent in more run of the mill
policy disputes or in contexts in which political allegiances are more divided.  Nor does this
mean that internal constraints are ineffective just when it counts.  To the contrary, high-profile
political disputes are arguably situations in which presidents should be able to implement their
policies of choice in order to ensure democratic accountability of the executive branch, assuming
these policies accord with governing law.  In such contexts, success and effectiveness for internal
constraints may be better understood not as forestalling presidential control of policy but rather
as ensuring that contentious policy choices are made by the president and that the president’s role
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 Cf. Katyal, supra note 7, at 2337–38 (recommending transferring OLC’s adjudicatory86
function to independent official, removable only for cause, but making that official’s decisions
“subject to presidential override”).  Katyal explains that “a presidential overruling of [an
independent internal executive adjudication] could trigger reporting to Congress,” id. at 2339,
and also foster accountability by checking unelected director.  Id. at 2338 (arguing presidential
override appropriate because “lack of political accountability might dispose [director] toward
adventurism”). 
 Daniel Carpenter’s study of the emergence of bureaucratic autonomy during the87
progressive era, in which he underscores the important role that external networks played,
demonstrates that the dependence of internal constraints on external forces is not just a recent
phenomenon.  See Daniel P. Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy 26-33 (2001).
 Steven Lee Myers & Philip Shenon, Embattled Attorney General Resigns, New York88
Times, August 27, 2007, at XXX; see also David Johnston & Eric Lipton, Ex-aide Disputes
Gonzales Stand over Dismissals, New York Times, March 30, 2007, at A20 (noting resignation
of Chief of Staff to Attorney General Gonzales over dismissal of U.S. attorneys); David Stout &
David Johnston, A Top Aide to Gonzales Resigns, Becoming Latest Fallout Casualty, New York
Times, April 7, 2007, at XXXX (reporting resignation of Monica Goodling who helped
“coordinate” dismissals of U.S. attorneys).
 Indeed, former U.S. Attorney David Iglesias has argued that the scandal had a kind of89
paradoxical effect.  “There was a sense at first that maybe it was going to make it less likely for
U.S. attorneys to take more controversial cases, public corruption cases,” but, he explains, “It's
had the opposite effect. You've got U.S. attorneys that are really independent in a way they
haven't been in years.”  Interview by Emma Schwartz with David Iglesias, Looking Back on the
Justice Department Scandal:  A Conversation With Former U.S. Attorney David Iglesias, U.S.
News & World Rep., June 4, 2008, at XXX; cf. Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of
Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 117, 162 (2006) (“[A]dministrators may care a good deal
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is publicly known.   The primary onus for checking excessive presidential assertions of authority86
then falls to external forces, including Congress, the courts, and public opinion.  
More basically, focusing on the effectiveness of internal constraints alone ignores the
critical interdependent relationship between internal and external separation of powers.  Internal
mechanisms can have more traction when reinforced externally, and external checks may be able
to have such a reinforcing effect even if their ability to constrain the president directly is more
limited.  Recent history demonstrates the way that external mechanisms can reinforce internal
constraints.   Congressional hearings on the politicization of DOJ hiring and the politically-87
motivated firings of US Attorneys forced the resignation of Attorney General Alberto Gonzales
and several of his staff.   Even if politicized government hiring continued but was driven more88
underground, the hearings still likely served to reinforce civil service protections by making clear
the potential reputational costs of such behavior and emboldening career staff to come forward
with examples of abuse.   Two senators were able to force the FDA to reconsider its denial of89
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more about the reputational harms that flow from public censure than the legal consequences of
an adverse judgment (for which they are not usually personally liable). An administrator's
perceived failure to act with reasonable prudence can have devastating reputational costs, as
illustrated in the wake of Hurricane Katrina by the news media's excoriation of Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) director, Michael Brown.”).
 See Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Approves Broader Access to Next-Day Pill, New York90
Times, August 25, 2006, at A1; see also Gardiner Harris, Bush Picks F.D.A. Chief, but Vote Is
Unlikely Soon, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 2006, at A18.  Peter Strauss has noted the role played by
the need to obtain Senatorial consent for a successor in curbing presidential power to fire agency
heads, thereby reinforcing agency independence and expertise.  Strauss, Overseer, supra note 36,
42, at 735–36.
 Bart Gellman, Angler:  The Cheney Vice Presidency 354–57 (2008) (describing91
pullback from more extreme positions on treatment of detainees following Supreme Court’s
decision in Hamdan); Goldsmith, supra note 6, at 125 (“Whenever the Supreme Court threatened
to review one of the administration’s terrorism policies, [Solicitor General] Paul Clement was
able to eke out small concessions from the White House [such as] more formal procedural
protections for detainees.”).  Cornelia Pillard has argued more generally that the authority of
OLC and the Solicitor General within the executive branch depends largely on their being able to
“backstop [their] judgments in judicial doctrine.”  Pillard, Constitution, supra note 29, at 685.
 See Gilman, supra note 5, at 605 (“Media reports [on politicization of science] spurred92
some government agencies to conduct internal investigations that generated new policies to
protect agency scientists and promote transparency.  Thus, the media clearly enhanced
accountability....”);  Andrew C. Revkin, NASA Office Is Criticized on Climate Reports, N.Y.
Times, June 3, 2008 (reporting Michael Griffin, NASA agency head, quickly ordered review and
policy changes when pattern of distorting science was made public).
 See Kitrosser, Administrative Structure, supra note 66, at 608–09 (explaining White93
House refused to see the EPA's plans and did their best to ensure that others could not see them,”
even refusing to open email from EPA containing draft document recommending pollution
controls); Felicity Barringer, White House Refused to Open Pollutants E-Mail, N.Y. Times, June
23
over-the-counter status for Plan B by blocking action on President Bush’s nominee to take over
as Commissioner.   The Supreme Court’s habeas decisions undermined the more extreme90
ideologically-driven positions taken by high-level Bush Administration lawyers and—along with
public outcry over OLC’s the Torture Memo—appear to have led to some more moderate
positions.   Media exposure combined with pressure by professional organizations and other91
groups also forced some retraction in efforts to politicize science.   The Court’s decision in92
Massachusetts led initially to EPA’s political leadership changing its stance and acceding to the
agency staff’s view that greenhouse gases should be regulated under the CAA, although the
White House continued to stonewall such a move.93
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25, 2008; Juliet Eilperin, White House Tried to Silence EPA Proposal on Car Emissions, Wash.
Post, June 26, 2008.  Instead, the EPA sent out notice seeking further comment, delaying the
rulemaking until the end of the Bush administration.  Juliet Eilperin & R. Jeffrey Smith, EPA
Won't Act on Emissions This Year, Wash. Post, July 11, 2008, at A1.
 See Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight94
Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, in Congress, Structure and Policy 426, 427–30
(1987) (arguing Congress likely to depend on outside sources, such as citizens and interest group
for information directing oversight activities); Matthew D. McCubbins et al., supra note 76, at
434 (noting cost of oversight provides incentive “to set up a system in which someone else (that
is, a third party outside of the principal-agent diad) monitors the agent and reports acts of
noncompliance”); Patricia M. Wald & Jonathan R. Siegel, The D.C. Circuit and the Struggle for
Control of Presidential Information, 90 Geo. L.J. 737, 739 (2002) (explaining Congress requires
information from executive for legislative and investigatory tasks because “Executive is the
repository of the country's most important information for public policy formulation”).
 Katyal, Internal Separation, supra note 22, at 2347 (“Over fifty inspectors general serve95
today, and they are structurally insulated from control by agency heads and required to report
their findings biannually to Congress.”); see generally Light, Monitoring Government, supra note
26.  As Seth Kreimer has argued, internal separation of powers constraints may also play a
crucial role in enhancing transparency, and in turn accountability to external actors, through the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).  To be successful, requests under the Freedom of
Information Act usually require prerequisite knowledge, and requesters are therefore largely
dependent on leaks from civil servants or other insiders in identifying which claims for
information to pursue.  Seth F. Kreimer, the Freedom of Information Act and the Ecology of
Transparency, 10 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1011, 1025-32, 1037–45 (2008).
 See McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 94, at 427–30 (describing Congressional96
dependence on “fire alarms,” outside interest groups that highlight areas requiring oversight,
allowing Congress to focus resources on needs of constituents).
24
Equally important, the relationship between internal and external separation of powers is
not unidimensional:  Internal mechanisms can, in turn, play a pivotal role in enabling external
checks on the executive branch to function.  Congress needs information in order to conduct
meaningful oversight of the executive branch.   Internal agency experts and watchdogs are94
important sources of that information, whether in the guise of formal reports, studies, and
testimony or more informal conversations and leaks.   Procedural constraints within agencies95
can serve a similar function of ensuring that Congress is aware of agency activities.   Internal96
mechanisms also reinforce Congress’s role by creating bodies of personnel within the executive
branch who are committed to enforcing the governing statutory regime, which sets out the
parameters of their authority and regulatory responsibilities, and on whose expertise functioning
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 Bruff, supra note 53, at 408 (“By training and inclination, [civil service] bureaucrats97
seek legal authority for their actions.  Accordingly, they constitute an often unappreciated
bulwark to the rule fo law in its everyday application to the citizen.”).
 See, e.g., United States v. Nova Scotia Food Products Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 249 (2nd98
Cir. 1977) (“Adequate review of a determination requires an adequate record, if the review is to
be meaningful.”).
 See, e.g., Cobell v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1128, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing Morgan v.99
United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1938)).
 Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 60, at 52 (arguing case law driven by fear that100
executive expertise had been subordinated to politics).
 Tummino v. Von Eschenbach, 427 F. Supp. 2d 212, 230-34 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting101
concern that agency action not approved by scientific advisory committee in finding requisite bad
faith necessary for discovery beyond administrative record).  Inconsistency in an agency’s
opinion, particularly over a recent period, is often a good indicator that politics affected the
agency’s decision rather than expertise, and often leads to greater scrutiny.  See, e.g., Wyeth v.
Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1201 (2009) (refusing to show deference to agency’s determination of
preemption in part because reversal indicates determination not based on expertise); Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41–42 (1983)
(“Accordingly, an agency changing its course by rescinding a rule is obligated to supply a
reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which may be required when an agency does not act
in the first instance.”).  But see F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 1800, 1810
(2009) (“We find no basis in the Administrative Procedure Act or in our opinions for a
requirement that all agency change be subjected to more searching review.”).
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of those regimes often depends.   Courts are equally dependent on information and evidence97
compiled by agency personnel to adequately review agency actions, and have invoked this
dependence in justifying the requirement that agencies disclose underlying information and offer
detailed explanations of their decisions.   Moreover, despite regularly intoning that “it [is] not98
the function of the court to probe the mental processes of Secretar[ies] in reaching [their]
conclusions,”  judicial review of agency actions often appear to turn on judges’ perceptions of99
the role politics played in agency officials’ decisionmaking.   Evidence that decisions were100
made over the objections of career staff and agency professionals—sometimes indicated by
inconsistency in an agency’s position from its previous stance—often triggers more rigorous
review.   A particularly striking suggestion of how internal checks can effect judicial review101
came in the recent Boumediene litigation:  Just a few months after refusing to grant certiorari in
order to allow the CSRT process to proceed, the Court reversed course and granted review,
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 Joseph Landau, Muscular Procedure: An Institutional Surrogate in Times of Crisis, 84102
Wash. L. Rev. (forthcoming XXX) (manuscript at 41).
 See Katyal, Internal Separation, supra note 22, at 2341–42 (explaining how103
congressional reporting requirements might strengthen internal checks); Pillard, Constitution,
supra note 9, at 749–50 (arguing transparency encourages internal executive constitutionalism,
since the public can bring pressure on President to comply with constitutional provisions); see
also Johnsen, supra note 29, at 1596–97 (“Perhaps most essential to avoiding a culture in which
OLC becomes merely an advocate of the administration's policy preferences is transparency in
the specific legal advice that informs executive action, as well as in the general governing
processes and standards.”).  In some cases, however, disclosure may actually weaken internal
checks.  See Pillard, Unitariness, supra note 82, at 1302–03 (arguing that routine publication of
OLC legal opinions might discourage executive branch officials from seeking OLC’s legal
advice in the first place).
 See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 633104
(2000) (analyzing the impact of tripartite system of government on federal bureaucracy); M.
Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev.
603, 605–06 (2001) [hereinafter Magill, Beyond Powers] (arguing government separated not into
“three undifferentiated branches,” but rather into “large and diverse set of government
decisionmakers,” and considering implications of this for separation of powers analysis); Strauss,
Place of Agencies, supra note 17, at 622-25 (emphasizing import of separation of function
concerns for separation of powers analysis).
 See Katyal, Internal Separation, supra note 22, at 2316 (2006) (“The first-best concept105
of “legislature v. executive” checks and balances must be updated to contemplate second-best
“executive v. executive” divisions.”).
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apparently influenced in part by concerns expressed by military lawyers about how the tribunals
were functioning.102
The claim that internal and external separation of powers mechanisms are interdependent
is not novel.  Recognition of this interdependence figures most prominently in commentary on
how to enhance the effectiveness of internal mechanisms, which often involve suggestions for
strengthening congressional and public oversight of the executive branch through greater
disclosure.   It also surfaces, though more infrequently, in general separation of powers103
scholarship.   Yet the connection between internal and external mechanisms is often implicit104
and not the focus of sustained analysis.  Indeed, this connection is sometimes obscured by
discussions of how internal mechanisms can replace external checks on the executive branch and
analyses of external branch deficiencies that assess those branches’ ability to function in
isolation.  105
Bringing the interdependence of internal and external separation of powers mechanisms
to the forefront allows for a more realistic assessment of what internal executive branch
constraints can accomplish.   Although such mechanisms can act as important brakes on
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 This linkage need not be specifically to Congress and the courts; other external106
forces—state and foreign governments, the media, and civil society organizations such as
professional associations or advocacy groups—can also play a reinforcing role.  As noted above,
professional associations sought to publicize the administration’s interference with the work of
government scientists, see supra text accompanying note 92, and advocacy organizations have
brought repeated litigation to force disclosure of government policy. 
 Although varied in their specific subject matter focus, many reform proposals have107
emphasized the importance of greater disclosure as a mechanism for reinforcing internal
constraints.  See sources cited supra note103.
 Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 658–66 (1997) (finding judges of the Coast108
Guard Court of Criminal Appeals “inferior officers,” and reviewing supervisory checks on their
authority); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691? (1988); Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States,
295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935).
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executive branch excesses, they are not a panacea for failures in other branches to adequately
police the president.  On the other hand, it is also mistaken to conclude that the dependence of
internal mechanisms on external checks makes the former irrelevant, because this argument
ignores the reciprocal and dynamic relationship between these two.  Focusing on this internal-
external interdependence also holds important lessons for proposals to strengthen internal
mechanisms.  It suggests that the reforms that are most likely to bear fruit are those that explicitly
link external and internal constraints, to the benefit of each.106
III.  REINFORCING INTERNAL CONSTRAINTS THROUGH 
SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE
In this final section, I want to focus on one such potential reform:  reinforcing internal
separation of powers mechanisms through the medium of constitutional separation of powers
doctrine.  This reform technique has to date received relatively little attention in internal
separation of powers scholarship.   More importantly, as I will argue below, it has received107
scant attention in the context of separation of powers decisions, with reinforcement of internal
constraints being relegated instead to the realm of administrative law.  This doctrinal divide is
analytically perplexing and unfortunate, as it serves to hide the important function that internal
executive branch checks can—and do—play in our constitutional system.
A. The Absence of Internal Checks in Separation of Powers Analysis
Internal executive branch constraints feature regularly in separation of powers
jurisprudence.  The Court has repeatedly addressed the constitutionality of efforts to insulate
executive branch officers from at-will presidential removal, and internal executive branch
structure also surfaces in determining an officer’s status for Appointments Clause purposes.  108
Notably, however, these decisions generally treat internal constraints as a given and focus their
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 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685 (1988); see also id. at 697.109
 Id. at 670-77.110
 Id. 692-93, 695-96.111
 Roberto Suro, As Special Counsel Law Expires, Power Will Shift to Reno, Wash.112
Post, June 30, 1999, at A6 (discussing lapse of Independent Counsel Act).
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attention on determining if the specific constraints at issue represent constitutional violations
because they intrude too far on presidential power.  Less common, particularly in recent
decisions, is judicial recognition of the potential constitutional benefits from internal controls,
either in terms of guarding against aggrandized power from within or in reinforcing the ability of
the other branches to do so. 
Morrison v. Olson, upholding the constitutionality of the independent counsel statute, is a
good case in point.  The Court there analyzed whether limitations on the President’s ability to
control and oversee an independent counsel, including the requirement that the counsel could
only be removed for good cause, violated constitutional separation of powers principles by
“impermissibly interfer[ing] with the President’s exercise of his constitutionally appointed
functions.”   In concluding no such interference was present, the Court acknowledged the109
constitutional relevance of internal constraints governing the activities of independent counsels,
both for determining the counsels’ Appointments Clause status  and for ensuring that such110
provisions do not impermissibly undermine the constitutional values of accountability and
adherence to law.   Left unmentioned, however, was the possibility that the good cause111
provision and other internal constraints on presidential oversight in fact advanced these
constitutional values by ensuring that legal violations by high-level executive branch officials do
not go unpunished.  
To be sure, the independent counsel statute’s intrusions on presidential power were more
immediately salient and represented the basis on which the constitutional challenge was framed. 
Nor have time and experience been kind to the argument that the independent counsels served
separation of powers goals, with concerns about lack of accountability, prosecutorial excesses,
and politicization leading Congress to let the statute die in 1999.   It is nonetheless surprising112
that the Court did not discuss the potential constitutional benefits of such an internal constraint
on the executive branch, even in the course of upholding the independent counsel’s
constitutionality.  Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, the Court’s 1935 decision upholding
for cause limitations on the president’s ability to remove Federal Trade Commissioners, offers an
instructive comparison.  In the course of so holding, the Humphrey’s Executor Court argued that
at will presidential removal would exert a “coercive influence . . . [on] the independence of the
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 295 U.S. 602, 629-30 (1935).113
 Id. 114
 531 U.S. 457, 472–76 (2001).115
 Id. at 473.  As Peter Strauss has noted, the Court also gave no weight to the fact that116
the process the Environmental Protection Agency used in promulgated the air quality standards at
issue involved independent checks on agency discretion, specifically participation by outside
experts on the statutorily-mandated Clean Air Scientific Advisory Council.  Peter L. Strauss, On
Capturing the Possible Significance of Institutional Design and Ethos,  61 Admin. L. Rev. 269,
270-71 (2009) [Hereinafter Strauss, On Capturing].
 Cf. Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. 457, 487–90 (2001)117
(Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing power at issue was legislative).
 See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944) (noting power of the courts118
to “ascertain whether the will of Congress has been obeyed”); Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary
Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry 55–57, 219–20 (1969) (suggesting agencies should provide
standards to limit their discretion); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Disciplining Delegation After
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 452, 477, 479–82 (2001) (arguing
agencies cannot “lack any authority whatsoever to adopt narrowing constructions in the
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commission”  and portrayed this as serving a separation of powers function by guarding against113
presidential assumption of legislative and adjudicative powers.  114
Similarly absent in recent separation of powers jurisprudence are efforts to use separation
of powers doctrine to encourage executive branch adherence to or adoption of internal
constraints.  A striking decision here is Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, a 2001
decision rejecting the claim that the Clean Air Act’s delegation of authority to set emission
standards for pollutants that were “requisite to protect public health” was an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power.   The Whitman Court adamantly rejected the relevance of115
agency-imposed constraints to assessing a delegation challenge, stating “that [t]he idea that an
agency can cure an unconstitutionally standardless delegation of power by declining to exercise
some of that power seems to us internally contradictory.”   Whitman’s failure to acknowledge116
the separation of powers benefits of internal constraints is particularly notable because at issue
was transfer to the executive branch of broad standard-setting authority, a core legislative activity
even if one the executive branch could constitutionally perform.   Unlike Morrison, therefore,117
the constitutional danger most clearly presented on the face of the case was excessive
accumulation of power in the executive branch, precisely the type of danger to which internal
executive branch constraints would appear most constitutionally relevant.  Indeed, a number of
commentators had identified the importance of internal constraints that restrict agency regulatory
discretion to addressing delegation fears and guarding against arbitrary or abusive agency
action—as indeed had some earlier delegation doctrine precedent.    The net effect of Whitman,118
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delegation situation,” and that such authority should instead be derived from administrative
law);Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law, supra note 78 at 7& n.42 (contrasting Whitman with
prior case law looking to other checks, such as judicial review, to determine constitutionality).
 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2240 (2008).119
 Id. at 2247. 120
 Id. at 2269; see also id. at 2268 (“[T]he necessary scope of habeas review in part121
depends upon the rigor of any earlier proceedings ....”).
 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), is arguably another instance of judicial122
reinforcement of internal constraints, albeit more tacit.  According to Neil Katyal, driving the
result in Hamdan was the fact that internal executive branch experts on the Geneva Convention
and the law of war opposed the president’s position.  See Neal Kumar Katyal, Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld: the Legal Academy Goes to Practice, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 65, 105, 109–112 (2006)
(“The Justices consciously refused to award deference to the presidential determinations at issue
because they lacked support from the bureaucracy, and in particular the Judge Advocates General
and the State Department.”).  Yet as Katyal acknowledges, Hamdan’s strong emphasis on the
importance of congressional sanction at a minimum obscures the decision’s concern about the
lack of internal expertise underlying the administration’s position.  Id., at 112-13; see also
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however, was to disable delegation doctrine as a means of encouraging adoption of such
constraints and reinforcing adherence to their requirements.
An interesting contrast to Whitman’s insistence on the irrelevance of internal constraints
is the Court’s 2008 decision in Boumediene v. Bush, which held that the Military Commissions
Act (MCA)’s restrictions on the ability of Guantanamo Bay detainees to challenge their detention
through habeas corpus constituted a violation of the Suspension Clause.   Although involving a119
habeas challenge, the Boumediene Court underscored the importance of the writ of habeas corpus
to the separation of powers, explaining that through the writ the Judiciary retains “a time-tested
device . . . .  to maintain the ‘delicate balance of governance’ that is itself the surest safeguard of
liberty.”   Most significant for my purposes here, in holding the MCA unconstitutional Justice120
Kennedy’s majority opinion made repeated reference to procedural deficiencies with the
government’s internal administrative proceedings, the combatant status review tribunals
(CSRTs), at times suggesting that use of more robust internal procedural protections could have
led to a different result.  In particular, the Court emphasized that such alternative procedures can
be an adequate substitute for habeas and that in determining adequacy, “[w]hat matters is the sum
total of procedural protections afforded to the detainee at all stages, direct and collateral.”  121
The effect of Boumediene was thus counter to that of Whitman, in that here the Court
used its constitutional scrutiny to encourage the executive branch to adopt more robust internal
constraints.   Although it seems fair to say this was an intentional move on the Court’s part, at a
minimum Boumediene demonstrates that the Court’s lack of attention to the separation of powers
benefits of internal constraints is not universal.   Yet Boumediene’s express linkage of122
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Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 593-95 & n.23, 601-03, 613; id. at 636 (Breyer, J., concurring).  Instead,
the more obvious incentive created by Hamdan was to encourage the executive branch to obtain
congressional sanction for its policy of detaining and trying enemy combatants in military
commissions, which the administration promptly proceeded to do and which resulted in
enactment of the MCA. ee Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2242 (“Congress responded [to Hamdan]
by passing the MCA.”); Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 137–40 (explaining that following Hamdan,
“only Congress could help the administration out of its predicament”).
 Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2262 (“In light of this holding [that non-citizens detained at123
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba entitled to constitutional habeas protections] the question becomes
whether the statute stripping jurisdiction to issue the writ avoids the Suspension Clause mandate
because Congress has provided adequate substitute procedures for habeas corpus.”); Swain v.
Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381 (1977) (“[S]ubstitution of a collateral remedy which is neither
inadequate nor ineffective to test the legality of a person's detention does not constitute a
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.”).
 United States v. Mead. Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27, 230 (2001).124
 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 246 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Another practical effect of today’s125
opinion will be an artificially induced increase in informal rulemaking. Buy stock in the GPO.”);
Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public Action: Constitutional Doctrine and the Judicial
Manipulation of Legislative Enactment Costs, 118 Yale L.J. 2, 31–32 (2008) (“[I]n the
nonconstitutional administrative law context, whether an agency used formal decision-making
procedures in promulgating an interpretation of a statute is a central factor courts consider in
deciding whether the agency's interpretation is entitled to deference.”).
 United States v. Nova Scotia Food Products Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 249 (2nd Cir. 1977)126
(“Adequate review of a determination requires an adequate record, if the review is to be
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separation of powers doctrine and internal constraints remains a rarity, and reflects in part
specific features of habeas jurisprudence, which has long required absence of adequate
alternatives before a habeas claim will lie.123
Internal executive branch constraints and external judicial review are much more
frequently connected in administrative law doctrine.  Here the most salient recent example is
United States v. Mead Corporation, the Court’s 2000 decision indicating that Chevron deference
is predominantly granted to agency statutory interpretations promulgated using procedures that
carry the force of law.   By thus linking deference to particular procedures, Mead gave agencies124
an incentive to undertake notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication, both processes
that impose significant constraints on agency’s policysetting discretion.   Administrative law125
decisions have tied judicial review to internal constraints in other ways, such as justifying
extensive agency duties of explanation in rulemaking as necessary to allow meaningful judicial
review or expressing concern that judicial review may lead to excessive proceduralization of
agency decisonmaking.   Sometimes the connection is tacit, but nonetheless an evident126
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meaningful.”); see also Vermont Yankee Nuclear Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 547 (1978)
(noting concern that “Monday morning quarterbacking [of the type engaged in by the lower
court] not only encourages but almost compels the agency to conduct all rulemaking proceedings
with the full panoply of procedural devices normally associated only with adjudicatory
hearings.”).  Interestingly, some proposed linkages between judicial review and other constraints
have yet to find judicial favor.  The Court does not defer more to executive branch actions for
which there is evidence of greater presidential oversight and sanction, see Kagan, supra note 39,
at 2372 (advocating such deference), or of political involvement more generally, see Peter L.
Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park: Political and Judicial Controls Over Administrative Actions
Affecting the Community, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 1251, 1329 (1992) (“The risks created by accepted
judicial participation in the political process should lead judges to pay serious attention to the
realities of political controls over administrative action before acting on the assumption that such
controls will not prove effective.”).  Nor is the involvement of state governments or expert
advisory committees generally deemed an acceptable basis for expanded deference.  See Am.
Trucking Ass'ns., Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Tatel, J., dissenting)
(arguing that because politically accountable state governments play primary role in determining
how to distribute burden or regulation, “courts have less reason to second-guess the specificity of
the congressional delegation”); see also Strauss, On Capturing, supra note 29, at 271.
 See, e.g., Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 60, at 53 (“[J]ust as State Farm held127
deregulatory decisions reviewable, in order to allow a judicial hard look at a decision that
allegedly injected politics into an expert judgment, so too Massachusetts v. EPA held the denial
of a petition requesting regulation to be reviewable, and for similar reasons.”).  Katherine Watts
has recently suggested that courts take a different approach, deferring to agency express
acknowledgment of the role politics played in their decisionmaking when such political
calculations are allowable by statute, as a way to limit the extent to which politics undermines
expertise in agency decisionmaking.  See Watts, supra note 60, at 5 (arguing that “what counts as
a ‘valid’ reason under arbitrary-and-capricious review should be expanded to include influences
from the President, other executive officials and members of Congress, so long as these political
influences are openly and transparently disclosed in the agency’s rulemaking record”).
 See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 266-68 (1954).  For128
discussions of Accardi, see Magill, Agency Self-Regulation, supra note ?, at 873-881; Thomas
W. Merrill, The Accardi Principle, 74 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 569 (2006).
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dynamic.  The prime example here is the greater scrutiny that the Court often applies to agency
decisions that appear driven by political considerations rather than expertise.   Another central127
linkage between administrative law doctrine and internal agency constraints is the rule that courts
will force agencies to follow their existing regulations, often referred to as the Accardi
principle.128
B. Should Separation of Powers Analysis Be Used to Reinforce Internal Executive
Branch Constraints?
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 See Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law, supra note 78, at 6–7; see also Bressman,129
supra note ?, at 479–81 (“[Whitman] shifts the source of authority for that requirement from
constitutional law to administrative law....”).
 See sources cited in note 128 and accompanying text discussing Accardi.  Many130
voluntary constraints, most notably Executive Order 12,866, providing for centralized regulatory
review by OMB, are expressly made not judicially reviewable.  See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58,
Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993), amended by Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72, Fed. Reg. 2763 (Jan.
18, 2007).
 I have argued elsewhere that the Court is similarly reluctant to openly acknowledge the131
constitutional basis of many core administrative law doctrines. See Metzger, Ordinary
Administrative Law, supra note 78, at 4–5.
 U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 18.132
 See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2269 (2008) (explaining, in reviewing133
whether military commissions adequate substitute for habeas, “[w]hat matters is the sum total of
procedural protections afforded to the detainee at all stages, direct and collateral”); Walters v.
National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 326 (1985) (“The flexibility of our
approach in due process cases is intended in part to allow room for other forms of dispute
resolution; with respect to the individual interests at stake here, legislatures are to be allowed
considerable leeway to formulate such processes without being forced to conform to a rigid
constitutional code of procedural necessities.”).
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Assessing whether the Court should use separation of powers analysis to reinforce
internal executive branch constraints requires greater understanding of why the Court’s recent
decisions largely fail to do so.  No doubt, a major reason is the availability of ordinary
administrative law to serve this role.   Ordinary administrative law provides a mechanism by129
which the Court can often reinforce internal constraints without expressly linking them to
constitutional law.  But this descriptive explanation really just serves to clarify the phenomenon
at issue.  The Court is plainly willing to enforce internal executive branch constraints—both
those imposed by Congress, and in some contexts those assumed voluntarily by executive branch
actors.   Its reluctance lies instead in acknowledging the constitutional role these constraints can130
play.   131
 I find this reluctance puzzling.  The strong judicial inclination to avoid unnecessary
constitutional questions does not justify it, as the Court is hardly avoiding constitutional
questions in cases like Morrison and Whitman.  More relevant might be a judicial concern that
emphasizing the separation of powers benefits of internal executive branch constraints suggests
that such constraints are constitutionally required and risks intruding unduly on Congress’s
prerogatives to fashion the administrative structure of federal government.   Yet it is surely132
possible to take internal constraints into account as one factor in a separation of powers analysis
without conveying that a particular set of constraints is mandatory.   The Court has done this in133
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 Edmond v. U.S., 520 U.S. 651, 662–63 (1997) (stating that “[w]hether one is an134
‘inferior officer’ depends on whether he has a superior” and that “‘inferior officers’ are officers
whose work is directed and supervised at some level by [principal officers]”); Morrison v. Olson,
487 U.S. 654, 671–72 (1988) (considering a variety of factors in determining that independent
counsels were inferior officers).
 See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2246–47, 2263–74 (2008) (finding135
writ of habeas corpus essential to separation of powers, but considering possibility of adequate
alternative); Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 697–706 (1997) (considering role of president and
judiciary and the extent that participating in court proceedings would burden president’s official
duties); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685–96 (1988) (weighing range of factors to determine
independent counsel law not upset constitutional balance).
  In this regard, Whitman’s formalistic emphasis on congressional guidance as the sole136
constitutional consideration in nondelegation challenges and lack of attention to more functional
considerations is particularly unsatisfying, given the decision’s functionalist justification for why
limitations on delegations are not rigorously enforced. Whitman v. American Trucking
Associations, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001) 474–75 (“[W]e have “almost never felt qualified to
second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to
those executing or applying the law.” (Citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416
(1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting))).
 In her article on presidential administration, for example, now Solicitor General Elena137
Kagan famously argued that courts should more readily defer to agency determinations where the
President is involved their formulation to enhance accountability and improve effectiveness. 
Kagan, supra note 39, at 2331–46.,statues as providing for presidential role).
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the Appointments Clause context,  and the general balancing and functionalist character of134
separation of powers analysis would seem easily able to absorb an additional consideration into
the mix.   Moreover, perhaps some form of internal executive branch constraints are135
constitutionally required to address the separation of powers concerns raised by the expansions of
executive power in the modern administrative and national security state.  Or, at least, the Court
should more directly engage that possibility before rejecting it.136
A more significant concern is institutional competency.  Courts may have difficulty
assessing internal separation of powers mechanisms in a principled yet meaningful manner. 
Internal constraints may simultaneously advance some separation of powers values while
undermining others; in particular, at the same time as they serve the constitutional goal of
checking excessive executive branch power, these constraints arguably undermine political
accountability and executive branch singularity.   Indeed, to some scholars the role that internal137
constraints play in strengthening external checks, particularly Congress, makes them
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 See Fox v. F.C.C., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1815–16 (2009) (“The independent agencies are138
sheltered not from politics but from the President, and it has often been observed that their
freedom from presidential oversight (and protection) has simply been replaced by increased
subservience to congressional direction.”); Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 13, 583 (1994)
(“[I]ndirect political control [by Congress] will necessarily exist with any so-called
“independent” agency or officer because absent presidential control, congressional oversight and
appropriations powers become the only concern for the officers of the allegedly “independent”
agencies.”).
 See John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional139
Interpretation, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 2003, 2040–47 (2009) (finding constitutional decisions derived
from background norms at odds with understanding of Constitution as finely crafted
compromise).
 See Gillian E. Metzger, Response: The Constitutional Legitimacy of Freestanding140
Federalism, 122 Harv. L. Rev. F. 98, 103–06 (2009).
 See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224–30 (2005) (finding detention141
procedures provide detainees adequate process); Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505
U.S. 123, 128–37 (1992) (finding parade ordinance invalid under First and Fourteenth
Amendments).
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constitutionally suspect as an effort by Congress to aggrandize itself at the president’s expense.  138
Separate from this indeterminancy concern is the problem that the practical effect of such
mechanisms is often contested and rests on aspects of government operations with which many
judges may be unfamiliar.  Thus assessing the impact of specific mechanisms may prove difficult
even when agreement exists on the relevant priority of the separation of powers values at stake.
  These institutional competency concerns are quite real, but ultimately unpersuasive as a
reason to forego reinforcing internal constraints through separation of powers analysis.  Neither
is unique to the context of assessing the potential constitutional benefits of internal executive
branch constraints.  The same concern with constitutional indeterminacy underlies criticism of
the Court’s willingness to move beyond specific constitutional provisions and base its
constitutional determinations on general constitutional values and principles.   But that issue is139
water under the bridge, in particular with respect to separation of powers analysis in which
general constitutional values and principles have long played a central role.    Difficulties in140
assessing practical impact are equally present when courts address other separation of powers
issues, such as how great an intrusion removal restrictions are on president’s authority and ability
to perform constitutional functions.  Indeed, courts regularly make such assessments in a variety
of constitutional contexts.   Moreover, the implications of this competency concern are not141
easily cabined to constitutional analysis, and also call into question efforts to reinforce internal
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 Indeed, the administrative law scholars have often criticized the Court on just this142
basis, with complaints that the Court’s decisions have served to ossify rulemaking being a prime
example.  See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking
Process, 41 Duke L.J. 1385, 1387-96, 1400-03, 1419 (1992).
 This latter route is the approach taken in Wyeth v. Levine last term, in which the Court143
indicated that it would titrate the weight given to agency assessments of the burden state laws
imposed on federal regulatory schemes based on the degree to which those assessments represent
an “informed determination[].” 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1201 (2009) ( “The weight we accord the
agency's explanation of state law's impact on the federal scheme depends on its thoroughness,
consistency, and persuasiveness.”).
 For suggestions in this vein, see Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law, supra note 78,144
at 7–12).
 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553(a) (exempting matters involving military and foreign affairs145
from the scope of the APA); Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796 (1992) (holding the
president is not an agency under the APA).
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checks and otherwise encourage agency self-regulating behavior through administrative law.  142
As a result, this competency concern cannot justify the current disparate treatment of internal
constraints in constitutional as opposed to administrative law.
In addition, this concern rests on a misperception of the role courts would need to play if
separation of powers doctrine were used to reinforce internal constraints.  Courts could, as in
Boumediene, identify a fairly specific set of internal constraints as necessary to avoid a
constitutional violation.  But they could also serve a reinforcing role simply by taking such
constraints into account in the manner suggested above, as a factor that may support a finding of
constitutionality or greater deference.   They could even continue to rely primarily on143
administrative law doctrine, both as a means of reinforcing internal checks and more directly
policing against undue agency politicization, and simply acknowledge more openly the
constitutional separation of powers function that administrative law is then performing.  144
Neither concerns with judicial overstepping or judicial institutional competency thus
justify ignoring the potential separation of powers role that internal executive branch constraints
can serve.  That still leaves the question of what is gained by including this recognition and
seeking to reinforce such internal constraints through constitutional separation of powers
analysis—rather than leaving this task, as at present, to the realm of ordinary administrative law.  
One practical issue is that a number of instances involving alleged presidential overreaching do
not arise in a form that allows a direct administrative law challenge.   But viewed more145
systematically, administrative law often functions well as a reinforcement mechanism,
particularly given the Court’s willingness to manipulate doctrine if necessary to ensure that
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 Massachusetts v. EPA is perhaps the clearest recent example of this phenomenon. See146
Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 15, at 108–09 (suggesting Court, in Massachusetts v. EPA may
have attempted to “nudge” agencies away from politicization and strong presidential
administration by employing more rigorous scrutiny).
 See Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law, supra note 78, at 3 (“What is less often147
acknowledged is the degree to which constitutional concerns permeate ordinary administrative 
 See Scott Shane, A.C.L.U. Lawyers Mine Documents for Truth About Detainees and148
Interrogations, New York Times, August 30, 2009, at A4 (describing surprise at the success of
the ACLU’s FOIA requests with respect to the government’s detention policies and activities);
see also Evan Perez & Deborah Solomon, Treasury Retreats from Standoff with TARP
Watchdog, Wall Street Journal, Sept. 2, 2009, at XXX (describing push for independence of
Special Inspector General for Troubled Asset Relief Program by Republican lawmakers).
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perceived excesses of presidential politicization do not escape judicial administrative law
review.146
Although effective in practice, the Court’s current approach suffers from analytic and
normative deficiencies.  Relying on ordinary administrative law obscures the legitimate
constitutional role that internal executive branch constraints can play, potentially leading to an
incomplete separation of powers analysis that perceives such constraints in unduly negative
terms.  It also fuels misconceptions about the status of ordinary administrative law doctrine and
undermines transparency in administrative law contexts, with the constitutional concerns
motivating decisions too rarely being acknowledged.   Particularly given the constant battle147
over the proper scope of judicial review in administrative law, fuller recognition of the
constitutional role of internal executive branch constraints can play—and thus of the potential
constitutional benefits of judicial reinforcement of such constraints—is merited. 
CONCLUSION
The public administration scandals of the Bush administration and recent regulatory
failures have rightly focused scholarly and public attention on questions of institutional design. 
Often disparaged mechanisms for ensuring executive branch accountability, such as the Freedom
of Information Act or the civil service, are suddenly being viewed in a more positive light.  148
Although these design questions are largely approached in policy or functional terms, they also
carry constitutional resonance.  Highlighting this constitutional dimension offers the possibility
not only of reinforcing internal executive branch constraints through separation of powers
analysis, but also of greater appreciation of how to achieve separation of powers goals in the
contemporary world of administrative governance.
